A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement axiom roughly states that given two groups of individuals, if these two groups select the same alternative, then this alternative must also be selected by their union. Condorcet social choice procedures are known to violate this axiom. Our goal in this paper is to put this important voting theory result into perspective. We then proceed by evaluating how frequently this phenomenon is susceptible to occur.
Introduction
Most of the literature on voting theory is concerned with the theoretical debate between Condorcet consistent social choice methods on the one hand, and positional (or scoring) systems -voting à la Borda -on the other hand. There are several arguments in favor of either type of procedures, discussed in an abundant literature (see Nurmi 1987 and 1999 , and Saari 2006 among others).
One of the strongest arguments in favor of Borda's approach is the reinforcement axiom (RA). The notion of reinforcement was first introduced by Smith (1973) , under the name of separability. The intuition is as follows: if two different blocks of individuals rank an alternative at least as high as some other alternative, then so does the combination of the blocks with regard to these two alternatives.
In the same way -and indeed at the same period - Young (1974 Young ( , 1975a proposes a variant of the notion of separability, which he calls consistency. Following this idea, if two disjoint groups of individuals separately select two non-disjoint subsets of alternatives, then the union of these groups should exactly select the intersection of the two subsets. In fact, the difference between the two contributions lies in the type of social choice mechanisms studied: Young is concerned with social choice correspondences (selecting possibly more than a single alternative), while Smith is interested in aggregation functions (selecting a social ranking of alternatives from preferences reported by individual voters).
And finally, in the special context of social choice functions (correspondences selecting a unique outcome), which we consider in this paper, Moulin (1988) introduces the phrase reinforcement axiom (RA).
In order to illustrate this phenomenon, consider the following situation, concerning two french districts. For several years now, there has been a project of reunification of two northwestern districts, the "Basse-Normandie" (almost 1 500 000 inhabitants with Caen as the capital) and the "Haute-Normandie" (almost 1 800 000 inhabitants and Rouen as the capital). Almost all the inhabitants of these two districts agree with this project, but they disagree on the new capital. They will have to choose between three cities, Caen, Rouen and Le Havre (which is another big city in Haute-Normandie). Given the importance of this decision, we assume that the chosen project must be firstly accepted by each of the two districts separately; and secondly, if both districts choose the same city, then there is a further step, in which all inhabitants of both districts will be asked to cast their votes. 1 Now, after the first step of the process, assume that the inhabitants in Basse-Normandie and in Haute-Normandie have chosen Caen. Further, assume that with the same individual preferences Le Havre is the winner of the second step. Then Caen wins in each of the two districts separetely, but not in their union. This is typically an example of violation of the reinforcement axiom.
The main results concerning the violation of RA are summarized in Young's theorem (1975a) . According to this theorem, all simple positional voting procedures satisfy RA, while on the contrary there is no Condorcet social choice procedure satisfying that axiom.
There is no doubt about the importance of this proposition, since it provides a clear axiomatic boundary between Borda's and Condorcet's approaches of social choice mechanisms. In this paper, we examine the violation of RA under the most widely studied Condorcet procedures (see Fishburn 1977 or Rasch 1995 , among others). Our goal is to examine precise conditions at which violations 1 This process is usual in France, especially for a constitutional revision.
of RA are susceptible to arise under these rules. We give, among other statements, conditions on the minimum number of voters at which the phenomenon arises.
Besides, this normative contribution is completed by a measure of the quantitative significance of the violation of RA. Indeed, if the likelihood of such violation of RA is negligible, then one need not be unduly worried about the existence of the possibility as such. In fact, although these rules violate RA, this should not be a serious ground for rejecting them or to discriminate in favor of Borda's approach (see Courtin et al. 2010 for a study on the violation of RA under sequential positional procedures).
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 is a presentation of Condorcet social choice functions with definitions and some preliminary results about these rules. Section 3 provides some general results on the behavior of Condorcet's rules vis-à-vis the reinforcement axiom. Then, Section 4 studies the conditions at which a profile may violate the axiom, and provides the corresponding frequencies. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Condorcet social choice functions
In this section, we begin with formal definitions of Condorcet rules and we investigate some relationships between them.
Notations and definitions
Consider a finite set N of n individuals or voters, with n 2 and a finite set A of m alternatives, with m 3. Suppose two disjoint groups (or constituencies) T 1 and T 2 of individuals, with
Let 2 A be the set of nonempty subsets of A. Assume that the preference relation R i of individual i, i 2 N , is a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation (or simply a linear order) on A and let L = {R k : 1  k  m!} be the set of all linear orders on A. A profile on A is an n-tuple R N = (R i ) i2N of individual preference relations, one for each individual. The set of all profiles on N will be denoted by L N . Similarly profiles on T 1 and T 2 will be denoted R T 1 and R T 2 , respectively. Definition 1. Let N be the nonempty set of voters. Then i) A social choice function (SCF ) is a mapping that associates a single alternative with any profile over a nonempty subset of N .
ii) A social choice correspondence (SCC ) is a mapping that associates a nonempty subset of alternatives with any profile over a nonempty subset of N .
Note that F R N and C R N , given an SCF F and an SCC C, are the images determined respectively by F and C for a set of alternatives A and a profile R N on that set. Given a profile R N and alternatives x, y 2 A, we denote by n(x, y, R N ) the number of individuals in R N who prefer x to y (or simply n(x, y) when there is no ambiguity). Hence n(x, y)+n(y, x) = n. Then the simple majority relation M on A determined by profile R N is defined by xM y iff n(x, y) > n(y, x).
There is a tie between x and y under simple majority if n(x, y) = n(y, x). Definition 2. An SCF F is a Condorcet SCF if and only if it satisfies the Condorcet Principle, that is for all profile R N and all x 2 A, xM y for all y 2 A implies F R N = x.
We now define the rules under study in this paper. In order to do this, we follow Fishburn's 1977 terminology 2 . For each SCC (C j ), we obtain an SCF (F j ) by breaking ties in favor of the alternative coming first in the lexicographic order. For example, if two alternatives x and y are tied, then F R N = x.
is the Borda score of x given R N . According to this function, if no candidate beats or ties every other candidate on the basis of simple majority, then the SCF should be determined by the Borda scores.
, where c(x, R N ) = |y 2 A : xM y| |y 2 A : yM x| is the Copeland score of x, that is the number of alternatives beaten by x minus the number of alternatives that beat x.
is the number of binary preference reversals needed in R N to make x tie or beat every other candidate in A on the basis of simple majority. A reversal occurs when xR i y is changed into yR i x. In other words d(x, R N ) is a measure of how little R N needs to be changed to make x tie or beat every other candidate.
is the number of voters in the largest sublist from R N for which x ties or beats every other candidate in A on the basis of simple majority with respect to this sublist. If there is no such sublist then e(x, R N ) = 0. This means that E(x, R N ) = n e(x, R N ) gives the fewest number of voters that must be deleted from R N for x to tie or beat every other candidate.
In contrast to Dodgson's function, Young's function deletes voters rather than reversing preferences to obtain a majority winner.
. That is f (x, R N ) measures the worst that x does against any other candidate.
Condorcet's function selects the alternative with the largest minimum support in all pairwise comparisons. It sometimes goes under the names of minimax rule (Young 1975b) or maximin rule (see for example Nurmi 2002).
R k 2 L and xR k y f or all y 2 A} (or simply k(x) when there is no ambiguity). Kemeny's function can be viewed as a measure of the closeness of individual preferences in some profile with the linear order R k derived from that profile as indicated above. C 7 . Schwartz's function: C 7 R N = {x 2 A : ySx f or no y 2 A}, where xSy iff there are Schwartz's function elects the alternative that is beaten by no other alternative according to the majority election, directly or indirectly. C 8 . Fishburn's function: C 8 R N = {x 2 A : yF x f or no y 2 A}, where xF y iff for every a 2 A, aM x ) aM y; and there is a w 2 A such that wM y and not (wM x).
Fishburn's function is based on the notion that if every candidate that beats x also beats y under simple majority, and if there exists some candidate that beats y but not x, then x is "better than" y under simple majority comparisons.
We now introduce another Condorcet SCF, not defined by Fishburn (1977) , the Amendment's function (see Farquharson 1969 ) denoted C 9 .
C 9 . Amendment function: With A = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m }, the outcome of C 9 is the alternative C 9 R N defined as follows:
ii) For any 2  j  m, the winner C 9 R N j of the majority pairwise contest between
and a j is defined by
, the winner of the last majority contest against a m . The intuition of this procedure is as follows: any motion C 9 R N j 1 is saved as long as a strict majority does not reject it in favor of some other motion a j given the agenda A = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m }.
The special case of three alternatives
Some additional notations will be necessary to present some results in the three-alternative case. With A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, the six possible linear orders on A are: We shall distinguish two cases : (i) when there is a Condorcet cycle, and (ii) when there is none.
Condorcet Cycle
We first show how to compute the score of each alternative a j , a k , a l 2 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, when there is a Condorcet cycle, according to Dodgson's, Young's, Condorcet's and Kemeny's procedures.
We begin with Dodgson.
Dodgson's procedure Proposition 1. If a k Ma j in some profile R N , then the minimum number of binary preference reversals needed in R N to make a j tie or beat a k is
where bxc is the floor function of x.
Proof. Consider two profiles
is the minimum number of reversals needed to have
, which can be rewritten as 2n(a j , a k , R N ) + 2d(a j , a k ) 2 < n, and since every term of this inequality is an integer, this can also be rewritten as 2n(a
It then follows from (1) and (2) 
, which completes the proof. Proposition 2. If there exists a Condorcet cycle at some profile R N , then the Dodgson score of an alternative a j is given by
, where a k is the unique alternative such that a k Ma j .
Proof. Consider some profile R N and some alternative a j and suppose there is a Condorcet cycle; then a j is beaten by only one other alternative, say a k . Since a j is beaten only by a k , the number of binary preference reversals needed in R N to make a j tie or beat every other candidate in A on the basis of simple majority, d(a j , R N ), is equal to the number of binary preference reversals needed in R N to make a j tie or beat
. As a consequence, we have the following Dodgson scores for the two Condorcet cycles, with A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }:
and Cycle 2 : a 1 Ma 2 , a 2 Ma 3 and
Young's procedure Proposition 3. If for each alternative a j 2 A there exists only one a
Proof. Let A = {a j , a k , a l } and consider a profile R N such that a k Ma j in R N and not (a k Ma j ) for some profile R N 0 obtained from R N by removing some voters that strictly prefer a k to a j . Suppose that R N 0 is obtained using a minimal number of cancellations E(a j , R N ). Let us prove that
Then relation (1) can be rewritten as follows:
is the total number of voters with preference relation of type a u a v a w . In that case by deleting exactly q voters in R N with preference relation (2) and (3) a j ties a k and defeats a l in R N 0 . Thus
In that case we delete all the voters in R N with preference relation a k a l a j or a l a k a j and exactly r voters with preference relation (5) and (6) a j ties a k and defeats a l in R N 0 . Therefore (1) and (7) it follows that
Proposition 4. If there exists a Condorcet cycle at some profile R N , then the Young's score of an alternative a j is given by e(a j , R N ) = 2n(a j , a k ) where a k is the unique alternative such that a k Ma j .
Proof. Consider some profile R N and some alternative a j and suppose there is a Condorcet cycle; then a j is beaten by only one other alternative, say a k . And by definitition E(a j , R N ) is the fewest number of voters that must be deleted from R N in order for a j to tie or beat every other candidate. By Proposition 3,
. As a consequence, we have the following Young's scores for the two Condorcet cycles with A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }: 
Condorcet's procedure Proposition 5. If for each alternative a j 2 A there exists only one a k 2 A such that a k Ma j at some profile R N , then the Condorcet score of a j is given by f (a
. And since there is only one alternative such that xM a j , this means that n(a 
and Cycle 2 : a 1 Ma 2 , a 2 Ma 3 and a 3 Ma 1
Kemeny's procedure We start by computing the score of each of the six linear orders, from a 1 a 3 ) + n(a 2 , a 3 ) .
In the same way, we have :
, S(R 6 )}. In the same way a 2 is the winner if max {S(R 3 ), S(R 4 )} > max {S(R 1 ), S(R 2 )} and max {S(R 3 ), S(R 4 )} max {S(R 5 ), S(R 6 )}. And a 3 is the winner if max {S(R 5 ), S(R 6 )} > max(S(R 1 ), S(R 2 )) and max {S(R 5 ), S(R 6 )} > max {S(R 3 ), S(R 4 )}.
As a consequence, we have the following proposition. 
Proof. With a Condorcet cycle 1, a 3 Ma 2 , which means that n(a 3 , a 2 ) > n(a 2 , a 3 ).
. With a Condorcet cycle 2, we have the converse,
The proof is the same for max {S(R 3 ), S(R 4 )} and max {S(R 5 ), S(R 6 )}.
From the previous propositions, we can deduce the following results.
Proposition 8. Suppose there exists a Cycle 1 or a Cycle 2. Then for all {x, y} ✓ {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 },
Proof. Suppose a Cycle 1 occurs. Consider {x, y} ✓ {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. For example x = a 1 and y = a 2 . It follows that
) and f (a 2 , R N ) = (n 1 + n 3 + n 4 ); e(a 1 , R N ) = 2(n 1 + n 2 + n 5 ) and e(a 2 , R N ) = 2(n 1 + n 3 + n 4 ); Proof. We examine all possible cases and observe that the result holds.
(i) Not (a 2 Proof. The proof is straighforward from Proposition 9. In fact the two procedures coincide when there is no cycle. Moreover by definition, the choice set from the two procedures contains the three alternatives when there is a cycle and by the tie-breaking rule, a 1 is selected by F j , j = 7, 8. Therefore F 7 = F 8 .
It can easily be checked that with more than three alternatives, the above theorems are no longer valid.
In summary, in a three-candidate context, the nine procedures can be reorganized into five classes, three of which are singletons.
Indeed, the criterion we use to distinguish those classes is the specific way they select the outcome of the election when there is no Condorcet winner.
-Whenever there is a cycle, Copeland's function directly relies on the tie-breaking device.
-Under amendment function, a 1 and a 2 can be elected if and only if they are Condorcet winners; in all other cases, the winner is a 3 .
All other functions are equivalent when there is no cycle (see Proposition 9). However, -Black's function systematically chooses the Borda winner and, if necessary, uses the tiebreaking mechanism.
-Each of Dodgson's, Young's, Condorcet's and Kemeny's rules uses a different way to determine the outcome when there is no Condorcet winner, but all these ways are equivalent.
-Finally, Schwartz's and Fishburn's rules, though based on different majority mechanisms when there is no Condorcet winner, are trivially equivalent in the three-election case.
Reinforcement axiom
We first present the reinforcement axiom property more formally.
Alternatively,
Smith (1973) and Young (1975a) show that all Condorcet social procedures violate the RA. In Example 1, we present a case of violation of RA by a Condorcet rule. 
The whole electorate
Copeland scores
This shows that the Copeland procedure violates RA:
Next, we identify conditions on the number of voters, under which the violation of RA is susceptible to occur for all the Condorcet procedures introduced above -and it appears that this is the case roughly as soon as the number of voters is equal to 7. This is reminiscent of Young's (1975a) result on all Condorcet procedures.
Proposition 10. With at least 13 voters and at least three candidates, all Condorcet procedures violate the reinforcement axiom.
Proof. See Moulin (1988), Theorem 9.2, page 237.
The above result covers all Condorcet voting procedures. However, for the procedures under study in this paper, we obtain slightly different versions of Proposition 10.
Proposition 11. In three-candidate elections with 7 voters, all Condorcet procedures F j with j = 1, 2, ..., 9 violate the reinforcement axiom.
Proof. Let F j be a Condorcet procedure with j = 1, 2, ..., 8; Case 1: Suppose that n is odd. By assumption on n, there exists a non negative integer p such that n = 7 + 2p. Consider the following profiles:
x y y z z x x y y z z y z x z x y y z x z x y z y z x y x z y z x y x In profile R T 1 , 2 + p individuals prefer x to z, versus p individuals who prefer z to x. Since p 0, by definition xM z . Likewise yM z since 2 + p prefer y to z. And x is tied with y since 1 + p individuals prefer x to y and 1 + p prefer y to x. By definition, for each C j with j = 1, 2, ..., 8, C j (R T 1 ) = {x, y}. By the lexicographic order, F j (R T 1 ) = x, for j = 1, 2, ..., 8. In R T 2 , with 3 favorable votes versus 2, x is preferred to z, y to x and z to y, then xM z, zM y and yM x. Then we have a Condorcet cycle 2. By definition of C 1 , b(x, R T 2 ) = 2 + 3 = 5, b(y, R T 2 ) = 3 + 2 = 5 and b(z, R T 2 ) = 2 + 3 = 5, then C 1 (R T 2 ) = {x, y, z} and F 1 (R T 2 ) = x. We have also c(x, R T 2 ) = 1 1 = 0, c(y, R T 2 ) = 1 1 = 0 and c(z, R T 2 ) = 1 1 = 0, then
. And finally, C 7 (R T 2 ) = C 8 (R T 2 ) = {x, y, z}, since there are clearly no Schwartz and no Fishburn relations over {x, y, z}. Then,
We can then conclude that F j (R T 2 ) = x, for j = 1, 2, ..., 8. In R N , y is a Condorcet winner, since yM x and yM z. Indeed, 4 + p versus 3 + p individuals prefer y to x and 4 + p versus 3 + p individuals prefer y to z. That is F j (R N ) = y for j = 1, 2, ..., 8. Case 2: Suppose that n is even. By assumption on n, there exists a non negative integer p such that n = 8 + 2p. Consider the following profiles: Using very similar arguments as in the previous case one can easily check that
. It then appears that in all cases considered above, all Condorcet procedures violate Young reinforcement axiom; and this concludes the proof for j = 1, 2, ..., 8. For j = 9, with the same reasoning as above, we reach the same conclusion, from the two following situations: Proof. Suppose A = {x, y, z, a 4 , a 5 , ..., a m } and let F j be a Condorcet procedure. Consider the distinct cases in the proof of Proposition 11 and the corresponding profiles R T 1 and R T 2 . Now, construct two new profiles R T 1 and R T 2 from R T 1 and R T 2 respectively, in such a way that alternative a 4 appears at the fourth position in each individual preference relation, a 5 appears at the fifth position, and so on. Each candidate in {x, y, z} is then prefered by a majority of individuals to all candidates in {a 4 , a 5 , ..., a m }. It follows that the winners are exactly the same as with R T 1 , R T 2 and R N respectively. That is
violates the reinforcement axiom.
The two propositions show that all Condorcet procedures introduced above violate RA when the number of voters is equal to or greater than seven, provided that the number of alternatives is at least three. In other words for all the procedures studied in this paper, we can always find a profile at which RA is violated, with at least seven voters and at least three alternatives. Below seven voters, we can find some pathological profiles, but not for all rules. Indeed, the reader can easily check that the minimum number of voters at which the phenomenon arise is three for Copeland, five for Fishburn, Schwartz and amendment. For the other rules, there is no case below seven. Note also, that it straightforwardly appears that with two alternatives there exists no Condorcet procedure which violates RA.
We will now turn to the evaluation on how frequent Condorcet procedures violate RA. In the next section, we focus on the special case of three alternatives.
The likelihood of reinforcement violation
Our main purpose in this section is to compare the nine Condorcet rules described above in terms of their susceptibility to violate RA. We only study the three-alternative case in this paper, since with four or more alternatives, computations are much more involved.
In order to do that we evaluate the proportion of preference profiles at which the violation of RA arises. We first have a typology of the various profiles at which this violation occurs. We can notice that if voting is restricted to profiles in which at least one Condorcet winner exists, then selecting the Condorcet winners satisfies RA. Indeed, if a majority in each of the two constituencies prefers a to x, then a majority in the whole constituency prefers a to x. Thus, the violation of RA is due to majority cycles. More precisely, given a voting rule, situations in which the voting rule violates RA are completely described by a set of linear inequalities (technicalities are available from the authors upon simple request). And from this typology, by the use of computerised evaluation processes, we obtain various frequencies measuring the susceptibility of this rule to violate RA.
The computer evaluation process consists in simulations using the traditional Monte Carlo method. Computer simulations are very often used in social choice in order to determine the frequencies of paradoxes, e.g., Nitzan (1985) or Kelly (1993) among others. The Monte Carlo simulations method is useful when a problem cannot be solved analytically.
Its principle is as follows : (i) we choose a probabilistic hypothesis, that is the way probabilities are assigned to events; (ii) we randomly generate under each probability approach a set of 100,000 profiles (a greater number does not significantly improve the results); and (iii) for each voting rule under consideration, we then count the total number of pathological profiles among the list of drawn profiles. The estimation of the likelihood that the rule violates RA is then derived as the following ratio:
Number of occurences of pathological profiles randomly generated Total number of profiles randomly generated
Note that the values we obtain are not exact probabilities, but rather estimates. For example, a value equal to 0 doesn't necessarily mean that the phenomenon cannot at all occur, but in fact, simply means that its probability of occurrence is very small. Two traditional probabilistic hypotheses are taken into account: impartial culture (IC) and impartial anonymous culture (IAC). Both are based on an equal probability assumption, but not exactly in the same way. Under the IAC probabilistic model, all anonymous preference profiles are equally likely to be observed: for every possible preference order, the number of voters reporting that order is drawn, in such a way that the total number of voters be equal to n. More precisely, for each n and each linear order we draw randomly the number n 1 of individuals with the first linear order. And then, again randomly, we draw the number n 2 of individuals with the second linear order between 0 and n n 1 , and so on. Under the IC probabilistic model and given any voter, the six rankings are equally likely to be the preference relation of this voter. In other words, for each voter, every preference order has an equal chance to be drawn ( 1 6 in the three-alternative case). For a more detailed discussion on these probabilistic models, see Reggenwetter et al. (2006) , or Berg and Lepelley (1993) , or Lepelley, Louichi, and Smaoui (2008) .
In this section, for each probabilistic hypothesis and each rule under study, we present tables of values and graphs corresponding to some values of the total number of voters.
Beside the results with Monte Carlo simulations, we also provide analytical results under the IAC hypothesis when the number of individuals is infinitely large. Within this framework, we use an analytical method -as distinguished from computer simulations -and provide exact relations giving the proportion of anonymous profiles vulnerable to the violation of RA. These results are obtained by the use of the technique of Fishburn and Gehrlein (1976) .
Impartial anonymous culture

Simulations results under IAC
We consider the case where n 2 {25, 50, 75, 100} and t (the size of any of the two constituencies) changes from 1 to at most n 2 (Tables 1 and 2) 3 . Note that cases where t n 2 are symmetrical to those where t  n 2 . For example, for n = 25, the results are the same with t = 1 and t = 24. Table 1 (IAC 1) Frequencies of violation of RA for Condorcet procedures with n = 25 and n = 50 t n= 25 n = 50
5,54E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 Note that in the tables, the notation xE-y is used as an equivalent for x ⇥ 10 y , where x and y are real numbers. The corresponding figures are below. These results illustrate the following facts: (i) for all rules under study, it appears that for any given value of n, and for all values of t, frequencies of violation of RA are relatively small (generally smaller than 1%); (ii) although all frequencies are rather small, they are clearly smaller for F 3 F 4 F 5 F 6 than for F 2 , F 7 F 8 and F 9 ; and for these three families of rules the results are relatively close, as illustrated in Fig.  6 ; (iii) it must also be noticed that F 1 appears as the worst procedure, especially when the size of one of the two constituencies is relatively greater than the size of the other one; (iv) except for F 1 , for any fixed value of n, frequencies slightly increase when t rises (fluctuations are due to even or odd values of t) as illustrated in Figs. 2, 3 , 4, 5; (v) for any given value of t, frequencies for F 3 F 4 F 5 F 6 decrease when n rises, whereas this is not clear for F 2 , F 7 F 8 and F 9 ; (vi) it follows that frequencies are higher as both constituencies tend to have the same size for all the rules with the exception of F 1 ; (vii) a contrario, frequencies for F 1 are relatively smaller with equal size constituencies. Indeed as observed in Fig. 1 , for any fixed n, frequencies decrease when the value of t rises, and for any given value of t, frequencies increase when the value of n rises.
To summarize, we have shown that for F j , j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, the frequency of occurrence is maximal when both group tend to have the same size, whereas for F 1 we have the opposite phenomenon. Now, one natural question is about the limit frequencies as n gets larger.
Exact limiting results
We now focus on large electorates-and indeed on infinite electorates, that is on cases where the total number of voters in both constituencies tends to infinity. Let RA (F j , 1) be the vulnerability of the voting rule F j as the total number of voters tends to infinity and RA (F j , ↵, 1) be the vulnerability of the voting rule F j as the total number of voters tends to infinity assuming that the proportion of voters in the first constituency is exactly ↵, with ↵ 2 ⇤ 0, 1 2 ⇤ . We provide closed-form formulae giving this likelihood for Copeland, Schwartz, Fishburn and the Amendment rules. For the other rules similar results require very involved computations. 4 We then can state the following results.
Proposition 13. Let the Copeland rule be the voting rule. Then
After computations it appears that RA (
. This result is consistent with the previous simulation observations.
For some values of ↵, we have the following results in Table 3 . Graphically, we have the following results in Fig.7 .
4
The main difficulty encountered is the evaluation of an 11-dimensional volume over a parameterized polytope. As seen above, it appears that: (i) in general, cases of violations are rather rare, (ii) highest frequencies are reached for electorates with equal size constituencies.
Impartial culture
As for IAC above, we consider n = {25, 50, 75, 100} and let t change from 1 to n 2 . Again, the Monte Carlo technique leads to the results provided in Tables 4 and 5 The corresponding figures are below. Once again, it can be observed from Figs. 9, 10, 11 and 12 that frequencies of F j , j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 are higher as both constituencies tend to have the same size. Moreover, like Fig. 1 above, Fig. 8 shows that F 1 is more sensitive to the violation of RA with unequal size constituencies. It also appears that the performance of F 2 , F 7 F 8 and F 9 are again very close, whereas frequencies of occurence are the smallest for F 3 F 4 F 5 F 6 and the highest for F 1 .
Besides, it appears that the occurrences of paradoxes are higher under IC than under IAC, which is very common in voting theory (see Gehrlein 2006 , chap. 5).
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to compare nine Condorcet procedures through the study of their sensitivity to RA. In order to do that, we were first concerned with the number of voters at which violations of the axiom occur. It appears that this is the case roughly as soon as the number of voters is equal to 7. Secondly, we provide frequencies of these occurrences. Most of these latter results are based on computer simulations-under two probabilistic classical hypotheses-but some other are obtained with the analytical Fishburn-Gehrlein technique. Results are given for the nine Condorcet procedures. Our results show how these frequencies change according to changes in the values of the total number of voters, and the size of any one of the two constituencies.
Further, it appears that for all these rules: (i) in general, cases of violations of RA are rather rare, (ii) although all frequencies are small, they are smaller for Dodgson's rule, Young's rule, Condorcet's rule and Kemeny's rule, and (iii) frequencies decrease for electorates with clearly uneven constituencies, with the exception of Black's rule. The main question motivating this study was whether one should be unduly worried about the theoretical possibility of violation of RA. The negative answer to this question is the main message of our analysis. Indeed, although all these rules violate RA, the frequencies of violation are very rare, as it is the case with sequential positional rules (see Courtin et al. 2010) .
Finally, we have observed that in the special case of three alternatives, Dodgson's rule, Young's rule, Condorcet's rule and Kemeny's rule always select the same winner whatever the profile. The same conclusion holds for Schwartz's rule and Fishburn's rule.
